Approved For Release 2002/06/14 : CIA-RDP71B00529R000200010005-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross	
SUBJECT : Analysis of Aerodynamic Force Needs (Nitze Study).	
REFERENCE: A. Memo for Secretary of the Air Force, et al., from Paul H. Nitze, St. 14 August 1968, Subj: Reconnais sance Program.	
B. An Analysis of Aerodynamic Reconnaissance Force Needs, dtd. 20 November 1968.	
1. Attached is the draft committee report for comment by the addressees in Reference A. (the memo from Mr. Nitze setting up the stuck).	
2. There are two primary issues in this paper which I feel are of significance to the DCI.	
a. The consequences of the best program handling (p. 2).	
b. The consequences of the methodology used to arrive to 147T and 154 drone force needs.	
3. The U-2 Issue	
The study makes no recommendation for the U-2 forces for the North Vietnam, South China, North Korea or the Middle East contingency "because of a combination of political and vulnerability factors."	K1A
The point is that the committee considered the U2R too vulnerable for cost/effective operations in these areas. The "Project study also found the U2R to be of relatively high vulnerability in the	
South China area. 25X	1C
I am sending a copy of the study to	X1A

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- 5. This entire issue is of importance to the DCI because neither the operator (USAF) or ASD/SA are explicitly considering the system factors essential to intelligence purposes. USAF is using the attrition figure to prove that both vehicles are essential. ASD/SA is using operating scenarios and failing to place any value on the difference in sensor characteristics or uncertainties in probable attrition calculations.
- 6. All of this assumes that the intelligence requirements stated by DIA in the study are sacred and without alternatives or options.
- 7. From an intelligence objectives standpoint, the choice between the USAF and ASD/SA position is clear. US Intelligence will lose an advantage in future flexability (1971-72 time period) against South China as well as other China contingencies if the 154 program is halted

The disadvantage in the USAF position continues to be the procurement rate of the older and less capable 197 series vehicles.

8. If the DCI desires to comment to the Deputy Secretary of Defence or the ASD/A on this study, I suggest that we prepare a memo including views.

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A/D/DCI/NIPE

Attachment:

References A. and B.

25X1A

cc: w/attach
25X1A /attach